BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
220.164.0.0/15
Announced exactly
- 220.164.0.0/15AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI Valid220.164.0.0
- Registry
- APNIC · China · Oct 30, 2002
- Delegated block
- 220.160.0.0 – 220.191.255.255
Covering routes
No less-specific route covers it.
More-specific routes
- 220.164.253.0/24AS134767CHINANET Sichuan province Chengdu MAN networkRPKI Valid220.164.253.0
- 220.165.0.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI Valid220.165.0.0
- 220.165.1.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI Valid220.165.1.0
- 220.165.2.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI Valid220.165.2.0
- 220.165.3.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI Valid220.165.3.0
- 220.165.4.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI Valid220.165.4.0
- 220.165.5.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI Valid220.165.5.0
- 220.165.7.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI Valid220.165.7.0
- 220.165.8.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI Valid220.165.8.0
- 220.165.9.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI Valid220.165.9.0
- 220.165.10.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI Valid220.165.10.0
- 220.165.11.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI Valid220.165.11.0
- 220.165.12.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI Valid220.165.12.0
- 220.165.13.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI Valid220.165.13.0
- 220.165.14.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI Valid220.165.14.0
- 220.165.15.0/24AS134765CHINANET Yunnan province IDC1 networkRPKI Valid220.165.15.0
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 128.139.0.0/16. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.